Is there a Term Structure in Land Lease Rates? by Hüttel, Silke et al.
 S
V
DFG
http://ww
Tel.: +
iAg-W
Is
i
Silk
iache
-Forschergru
Philippst
w.agrar.hu-b
49 (30) 2093
orkin
there 
n Lan
e Hüt
slav E
Herausg
ppe 986, Hum
r. 13, Haus 1
erlin.de/struk
Redakt
 46325, E-Ma
g Pa
a Ter
d Lea
tel, Ma
saulov
eber: 
boldt-Univer
2A, D-10099 
tur/institute/
ion: 
il: k.oertel@a
per 1
m Str
se Ra
tthias
, Mart
sität zu Berlin
Berlin 
wisola/fowiso
grar.hu-berli
7 (2
uctur
tes?
 Ritte
in Ode
la/siag 
n.de 
014)
e
r,
ning
Mai 2004); HU Berlin 

SiAg-Working Paper 17 (2014); HU Berlin 
SiAg-Working Paper 17 (2014); HU Berlin 
Is there a Term Structure in Land Lease Rates? 
Silke Hüttel, Matthias Ritter, Viacheslav Esaulov, Martin Odening 
Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin 
August 2014 
Abstract
This paper applies the concept of a term structure to agricultural land rental prices. Based on 
theoretical considerations, we develop a hedonic pricing model that allows for different 
shapes of the term structure curve while controlling for other price-relevant characteristics. 
We apply this model to land lease contracts in Saxony-Anhalt concluded between 2002 and 
2010. We find an upward-sloping term structure at the beginning, that is, market participants 
expected increasing rental prices. For the subsequent years, however, we detect a single-
humped term structure. Hence, market participants revised their expectations and assumed a 
decline of land rental prices in the long-term. 
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1 Introduction 
Land is an indispensable factor for agricultural production. Most farms gain access to this 
production factor via rental markets, and the share of leased farmland typically increases 
when farms are growing (e.g. Ciaian et al. 2012). As a result, leasing rates constitute an 
important part of farms’ expenses. Moreover, land rental prices are used to determine 
farmland values. Thus, it is not surprising that price formation on agricultural land leasing 
markets has received considerable attention. Myriads of hedonic pricing studies have been 
conducted that reveal the impact of farmland characteristics, the location of environmental 
variables, and subsidies and regulatory measures on land leasing rates (e.g. Swinnen et al. 
2008, Kirwan 2009, Breustedt and Habermann 2011). One issue, however, remains relatively 
unexplored in the empirical literature, namely the role of the term, for example the length of 
the leasing contract. In practice, the term of land rental contracts varies between short-term 
contracts of up to one year and long-term contracts of twenty years or more. It is intuitively 
clear that the contract term must be a determinant for the price of the contract, because it 
immediately affects the duration of future payments to be exchanged between tenant and 
landlord. The leasing rate upon which tenant and landlord agree when the contract is 
concluded reflects the spot rent that is expected to prevail during the contract period. This 
spot rent, in turn, will be determined by the cash flow that can be generated by using this 
asset, as well as by the availability of land in the future. In other words, the prices of land 
rental contracts with different maturities should contain information about expected 
conditions on land rental markets that are quite similar to the term structure of interest rates or 
commodity futures. Thus, it seems natural to exploit this analogy and to investigate whether 
land rental prices exhibit a term structure. This is tempting because the maximum maturity of 
land rental contracts is much longer compared with agricultural commodity futures, possibly 
allowing for insights about market expectations in the distant future. An upward-sloping term 
structure, for example, indicates that demand for land is expected to grow in the future, while 
little or no additional supply of land is expected, thus resulting in an increase of the short-term 
lease rate. In that case, the equilibrium lease rate must be an increasing function of the length 
of the contract because otherwise landlords would roll over a series of short-term contracts. A 
similar but converse interpretation holds for a downward-sloping term structure. 
The idea of analysing the term structure of leasing rates is not new. In a seminal paper, 
Grenadier (1995) provides a theoretical framework for the valuation of general leasing 
contracts and the term structure of lease rates. Following the procedure of term structure 
models of interest rates, Grenadier first derives a stochastic process for short-term lease rate in 
an intertemporal rational-expectations competitive equilibrium. Second, using this short-rate 
process, he determines an equilibrium term structure for lease rates. Grenadier’s paper has 
triggered a number of empirical studies on the term structure of lease contracts in real estate 
markets. For example, Gunnelin and Söderberg (2003) analyse the term structure in the office 
rental market in Stockholm. Using a hedonic rent equation, these authors find significant term 
structures in seven out of fifteen years in their observation period. Moreover, they identify 
different shapes for the term structure during a boom-and-bust cycle of the property market. 
Bond et al. (2008) find an upward-sloping term structure curve for office rents in London, but 
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this shape does not vary over time. In contrast, Fang and Ruichang (2009) report a downward 
term structure for the office rental market in Shanghai.  
Considering the attention that has been given to the term structure in real estate markets, it is 
surprising that no attempts have been made to estimate the term structure for agricultural land 
rental markets. The objective of this paper is to take a step in that direction. In particular, we 
pursue three questions: First, does a term structure even exist in land lease rates? Second, 
what shape does the term structure have? Third, does the term structure vary over time? 
Naturally, these questions can only be answered in the context of a specific land market. Here, 
we analyse a comprehensive data set of land rental contracts in Saxony-Anhalt, Germany, that 
are administered by the Bodenverwertungs- und -verwaltungs GmbH (BVVG), a land 
utilisation and administration company. The BVVG is responsible for privatising formerly 
state-owned farmland in the new German federal states, and is one of the key players on the 
land market in East Germany. Most importantly, the BVVG pursues a profit-maximising 
strategy, and land rental as well as land sales contracts are negotiated on a competitive basis 
(Dells 2008). This feature makes the data suitable for our research question. 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. In the next section, we review the 
theoretical background of the equilibrium term structure of leasing contracts. The presented 
model justifies various possible shapes of the term structure. Moreover, we discuss some 
critical assumptions that underlie the analysis. Section 0 describes the market under study. 
Since our data is provided by BVVG, the state agency responsible for the management and 
privatisation of the land under scrutiny, we first introduce the land market in Saxony-Anhalt, 
and emphasize its history of privatisation (0), and then introduce and describe the utilised data 
(0). Thereafter, we present the empirical approach for estimating the term structure and 
present the main results (Section 0). The paper ends with conclusions on the term structures of 
land leasing rates, as well as a discussion on the predictability of future land rents. 
2 Theoretical Background 
We start by introducing a land lease contract with maturity ܶ beginning at time 0 in which the 
landlord receives a flow of fixed (constant) rental payments ܴሺܶሻ from the tenant. Formally, 
this is equivalent to a fixed dividend paid out by an asset to its owner. Our objective is to 
derive ܴ as a function of ܶ, i.e., the term structure. We achieve this by applying no-arbitrage 
arguments as in Stanton and Wallace (2009). The (single) stochastic factor of this model is the 
spot lease rate X. The latter can be understood as the price of the flow of services from using 
the land (e.g. a gross margin). When the length of the lease contract goes to zero, we have 
ܴሺͲሻ ൌ ݔ, where ݔ is the current level of X. The spot lease rate can be modelled 
endogenously as, for example, in Grenadier (1995) or exogenously as in Clapham and 
Gunnelin (2003). To keep the model as simple as possible, we assume that the spot lease rate 
follows an exogenous geometric Brownian motion: 
(1) dX Xdt XdzP V  . 
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The value V of any contingent claim whose payoff depends on X and time t can be written 
according to Itǀ’s Lemma as 
(2)   22 2 21, 2
V V V VdV X t X X dt X
t X X X
P V V§ ·w w w w   ¨ ¸w w w w© ¹ .  
In this context, we can think of V as the value of a land rental contract. Stanton and Wallace 
(2009) show that—to avoid arbitrage opportunities—the value of a contingent claim on an 
asset paying a dividend R must satisfy the following partial differential equation: 
(3)  22 2 21 02
V V VX X rV R
X X t
V P Ow w w      w w w   
where r is a riskless interest rate, ߣ is an excess return defined by ߣ ൌ ߪ ή ݍ, and q is the 
market price of risk, which is assumed to be constant. The value for a land rental contract with 
term T can be derived from (3) by accounting for the boundary condition that its value is zero 
at maturity. The solution is then: 
(4)    ,0 1 rTRV x er   .  
Instead of offering a long-term lease contract with a constant rate R, the owner of the asset 
could equivalently roll over a sequence of instantaneous leases. The present value of the 
payments accruing from this transaction equals the value of an asset that pays a dividend X 
and has a value of zero at T. In this case, the differential equation (3) modifies to 
(5)  22 2 21 02
V V VX X rV X
X X t
V P Ow w w      w w w   
which has the following solution (Stanton and Wallace 2009): 
(6)     ,0 1 r TxV x er O PO P      .  
The value of the long-term lease and the value of the roll-over-lease must be the same. Thus, 
by equating (4) and (6), one can solve for the equilibrium lease rate: 
(7)    1
1
r T
rT
r eR T x
r e
O P
O P
  

§ ·§ ·  ¨ ¸¨ ¸¨ ¸  © ¹© ¹
.  
Equation (7) shows that the term structure curve starts at the current level of the short-term 
lease rate, ݔ, and converges to the level ݔ ڄ ݎ ሺݎ ൅ ߣ െ ߤሻΤ .1 That is, depending on the sign of 
                                                          
1  To see this, note that the ratio in the third term on the RHS in Eq. (7) converges to 1 if ܶ becomes large, 
while it converges to ሺݎ ൅ ߣ െ ߤሻ ݎΤ  if T goes to zero. 
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the risk-adjusted drift rate, ߤ െ ߣ, the term structure will be upward- or downward-sloping. If 
the risk-adjusted drift rate of the spot lease rate is positive, the lease rate of a land rental 
agreement will increase with the term of the contract. The opposite is true in the case of a 
negative risk-adjusted drift rate. An upward-sloping term structure indicates a market where 
agricultural output prices are expected to grow in the future. Increasing returns from farming 
will, in turn, increase the demand for land rentals. At the same time, the supply of new land is 
expected to grow at a lower rate. On the other hand, a downward-sloping term structure 
indicates a land rental market that is currently “hot”, but where prices are expected to decline, 
either because future prospects for the agribusiness are bad or because the new supply of land 
is expected in the long run.2  
Unlike in the housing market, where new supply is triggered if lease rates become large 
compared with investment costs, land supply is mainly the result of structural change in 
agriculture. Farms quitting agricultural production provide their land either on sales or rental 
markets. In principle, it would be possible to model the exit rates of farms as a function of 
their profitability and their opportunity costs (e.g. Pieralli et al. 2013). Deriving an 
equilibrium stochastic process for the spot rental price, however, is rather complex since 
farms basically bid and ask for land at the same time.3 
The two possible shapes of the term structure of lease rate that are supported by equation (7) 
are tied to the specific assumptions that have been made at the outset. If, for example, another 
stochastic process for the spot lease rate is assumed, different shapes of the term structure 
may arise. Specifically, in the context of fixed income markets Vasicek (1977) shows that if 
the stochastic factor follows a mean-reverting process, the term structure of interest rates may 
exhibit a single hump. A similar finding is reported by Grenadier (1995) for the term structure 
of lease contracts; a single-humped term structure characterises an intermediate case in which 
the new supply of land does not cover the expected demand in the short run but rather in the 
long run. As a result, the term structure is first upward-sloping and then downward-sloping. In 
our empirical analysis, we will allow for upward-sloping, downward-sloping and single-
humped term structures. 
3 The Market under Study: Land Rentals in Saxony-Anhalt 
3.1 The Land Rental Market in Saxony-Anhalt and Privatisation 
We focus here on Saxony-Anhalt, one of the federal states in East Germany, with the aim of 
exploring the role of terms in land rentals. Generally speaking, land rentals are important in 
East Germany’s agriculture: the share of rental land per farm in Saxony-Anhalt (as in East 
                                                          
2  The forward rental price ܴሺܶሻ is an unbiased estimator of the expected future spot rent ܧሺܺሺܶሻሻ only under 
restrictive assumptions. Clapham and Gunnelin (2003), for example, prove that a stochastic interest rate r 
may bias the expectation hypothesis. 
3  For a more detailed discussion of this issue, we refer to Kersting et al. (2013). 
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Germany in general), was 77 per cent, on average, in 2010 and is substantially higher 
compared to whole Germany, which had an average share of about 60 per cent in 2010 
(Statistisches Landesamt Sachsen-Anhalt 2011).  
Similar to all the federal states in East Germany, Saxony-Anhalt’s agricultural structure is 
influenced by the Eastern German history of expropriation, land collectivisation and socialist 
policy between 1945 and 1989. Today’s land market (sales and rentals) is also substantially 
characterised by the privatisation of the formerly state-owned land. After the German 
reunification in 1990, a privatisation agency (Treuhandanstalt) administrated and started the 
privatisation process of the formerly state-owned properties, including agricultural and forest 
assets (Dells 2008).4 In 1992, the Bodenverwertungs- und -verwaltungs GmbH (BVVG) was 
established and took over the tasks of the Treuhandanstalt privatisation agency with regard to 
the management, privatisation and restitution of the agricultural / forest land on behalf of the 
Federal Ministry of Finance. The privatisation was organised in three phases (Dells 2008): 
leasing, selling at reduced prices under the land purchase program, and selling at market 
prices through public tenders.  
In the first years, the BVVG preferably rented out (but also sold) the land to local farmers, 
those attempting to become local farmers (Neueinrichter), and to formerly local farmers 
attempting to resume their farming business (Wiedereinrichter). Interested parties unrelated to 
the local farm business and without local connections (e.g. non-agricultural investors) were 
formally excluded from buying or leasing land at that time (Forstner et al. 2011). The 
preference for leasing was mainly because of unclear property, ownership and restitution 
rights, but also because of the desire to keep the land in farming business until the property 
rights were clarified.5 During the first phase, after a short period of only short-term contracts 
with administrative prices due to missing market structures, mainly long-term contracts with a 
term of 6–12 years (sometimes more) were negotiated to buy time for the clarification of 
property rights. In 1999, the tenants had the opportunity to extend the rental term by request 
up to a total term of approximately 18 years. According to the BVVG (2012), this option was 
used by the majority of tenants.  
From mid-2004 onwards, the BVVG negotiated new short-term lease-contracts, and long-
term contracts only in special cases (Müller 2004). Land sales are carried out using first price 
auctions with a public tender; however, bidders may either bid for buying or for leasing the 
land where the highest bid wins. Thus, long-term rentals are possible but the length of a rental 
contract is limited to 9 years (Deutscher Bundestag 2008). In 2007, a new privatisation 
concept was introduced: selling the land was strictly preferred over leasing. The concept was 
renewed in 2010 and privatisation should be completed by 2025. From 2010 on, the current 
                                                          
4  See Koester and Brooks (1997) for further details. 
5  According to Koester and Brooks (1997), some estimates suggest that a large share of the land administrated 
by the Treuhandanstalt privatisation agency did not in fact have any pending claims. The preference to rent 
out the land might have been due to other reasons such as fear of depressed land prices. 
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tenants have the opportunity to directly re-negotiate their rental contract with a term from 4 to 
9 years without public tender (Müller and Kittler 2012). 
In addition to the BVVG, the Landgesellschaft Sachsen-Anhalt mbH (LGSA) is another 
institution that supplies formerly and currently state-owned land. The main difference to the 
BVVG is that the rental rates for land rented out by the LGSA are purely administrative and 
negotiated in favour of the local farmers; thus, on average their rates are much lower than 
market-based prices. Besides the institutional suppliers of land, the so-called private land 
market also seems to play a role in Saxony-Anhalt: retired farmers or former de-possessed 
owners act as suppliers and the price is either negotiated or found by auction-based 
procedures with locally-published calls for tenders.  
The BVVG rental prices can be characterised as competitive. Prices are formed either through 
bilateral negotiations with the current lessee or by tendering (Müller and Kittler 2012). 
Moreover, the BVVG uses a price information system (Vergleichspreissystem) for its price 
negotiations that allows one to assess the price of a plot based on realised prices of plots with 
comparable characteristics. In general, rental prices are regularly renegotiated and from 2005 
onwards, this was formally introduced into the standard rental contracts showing price 
adjustment clauses with a bi-annual renegotiation. 
Figure 1 depicts the development of land rental prices in Saxony-Anhalt obtained by the 
BVVG and what is reported by the official statistics in Saxony-Anhalt. The latter should 
contain all contracts running or being newly-negotiated in the respective years, including 
those from the BVVG.6 Figure 1 also distinguishes between the prices of running contracts 
that have been negotiated earlier and the prices of newly-established contracts in the 
respective year. A substantial increase is observed after 2005, particularly for new BVVG 
contracts. One possible reason might be that in this year, the 2003 reform of the EU Common 
Agricultural Policy (CAP) became active; its intention was to fully decouple the direct 
payments stepwise until 2015. It has been reported that many contracts for low-quality land 
were also fixed during this period, mainly to receive EU direct payments, which require active 
land use (Müller and Kittler 2012). After 2007, another price increase is observed for new and 
running rentals in both data sources. While in the majority of the years the BVVG prices lie 
above the official statistics price, from 2003–2005 the prices for new contracts were higher in 
the official statistic data compared to the new contracts of the BVVG, and also to the prices of 
the running BVVG contracts. This is perhaps because only few contracts were negotiated by 
the BVVG at that time due to the long-term rentals starting in the mid-1990s (Müller and 
Kittler 2012). In 2004 and 2005, a small decrease in the BVVG prices could be observed, 
which might be partly explained by the temporary exposure of the tendering procedure with 
the option to either bid for buying or renting.  
                                                          
6  According to the German law of land transactions (Grundstücksverkehrsgesetz), the committee of land 
transactions (Oberer Gutachterausschuss für Grundstückswerte) must be notified of each new or adjusted 
rental contract. 
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Figure 1.  Average rental prices in Saxony-Anhalt, 1995–2011 
 
* until Oct-31, 2011 
Data: BVVG and Statistical Office in Saxony-Anhalt. 
 
3.2 Data 
The empirical analysis is based on a data set of individual land rental contracts signed by the 
BVVG. Focusing on this data set only has the advantage that the rental contracts are rather 
homogeneous and have been negotiated in a comparable way. The original data set covers all 
running land lease contracts from 2006–2010 signed between 1954–2010. This implies that 
contracts ending before 2006 were not in the original sample. Considering all observations 
would imply that long-term contracts are over-represented in the sample. As a compromise 
between the number of observations and the bias of missing short-term contracts, we exclude 
observations with contracts negotiated before 2002.  
The original data contain contracts with various land types (arable land, grassland, other) that 
appear in different proportions and have different prices. The homogeneity of the contract 
subject is an important issue (cf. Gunnelin 2003) for ensuring comparability over time. Hence, 
we only consider contracts that include arable land and analyse only the respective prices for 
arable land. We furthermore select comparable contract types, that is, we exclude rentals of 
whole farms or manors as well as contracts with other noted peculiarities, for example without 
price adjustment. Thus, the considered contracts contain all similar price adjustment clauses: 
before 2005, the price has been renegotiated every 4 years, and from 2005 on the prices are 
adjusted on a bi-annual basis (cf. Section 3.1).  
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The term structure incorporates farmer expectations regarding future transformations of the 
spot rent. These expectations change over time and as a result, the term structure may change 
accordingly. To ensure that expectations about future price developments are conditioned on 
the same information set, we restrict our analysis to contracts that were negotiated at the same 
time each year. Fortunately, 94 per cent of the contracts were concluded in October, so we can 
focus on these contracts without losing much data.  
In addition, we remove outliers that are possibly due to incorrect documentation below the 1st 
percentile and above the 99th percentile of the price–soil quality ratio. To summarise, each 
observed contract includes information on the size of the rented out plot and its composition 
(i.e., the shares of arable land, grassland, and other types of land), payment by land type, the 
soil quality index7, the starting date of the contract, the duration of the contract and the 
location of the plot at the county level. Further regional information about the respective 
location of the lot is unfortunately not available. The data set used in the end contains 2,504 
observations and the summary statistics are provided in Table 1.  
Table 1.  Descriptive statistics BVVG data, 2002–2010 (N=2,504) 
Variable Mean Standard Deviation Min. Max. 
Plot size (ha) 17.44 31.1 0.02 554 
Arable land (ha) 14.14 25.7 0.001 364.65 
Grassland (ha) 2.41 7.4 0 124.96 
Other land (ha) 0.90 4.29 0 190.75 
Share of arable land (per cent) 80.92 26.5 0.170 100 
Soil quality* (points [0,102]) 61.34 21.0 9 100 
Length of contract (years) 3.43 2.1 0 18 
Price of arable land (Euros per hectare) 318.66 167.2 54 1075 
*See footnote 7.  
Due to the selection procedure, the plots mainly consist of arable land (81 per cent) and vary 
from 0.2 per cent to 100 per cent. The average soil quality of 61 points in our data set 
accurately reflects the average soil quality of 60 points in Saxony-Anhalt. The average rental 
price per hectare of arable land is 319 Euros, with a standard deviation of about 167. The 
rental price varies from 54 to 1,075 Euros per ha. The prices, furthermore, vary at a regional 
level. As illustrated in Figure 2, the counties in the western part of Saxony-Anhalt reflect 
higher prices compared to the northern and very eastern counties. This variation can be 
explained in large part by the regionally differing soil quality and weather conditions.  
                                                          
7  The soil quality points are an official index in Germany that has been constructed so as to unify pedologic, 
scientific and (agro-)economic measures within one measure, and is specified for each officially-stated land 
parcel (several land parcels may constitute a plot of land). The higher the soil quality index, the higher is the 
quality of the land in terms of achieving a high potential yield from using the land. The highest value that has 
been measured is 102, and the lowest value was 7. 
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Table 2.  Distribution of the number of rental contracts over lease length and years in 
the observation period 
Year 
Term (years) 
<1 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  11  Total
2002 1 8 10 2 0 2 1 2 26
2003 2 9 24 7 5 1 0 1 3 52
2004 7 52 79 39 21 8 5 2 1 2 216
2005 3 75 31 17 6 0 2 0 0 1 0 135
2006 0 55 183 37 24 27 4 1 1 0 0 1 333
2007 3 61 86 14 24 106 1 1 1 0 1 0 298
2008 11 135 93 127 54 135 6 0 0 2 2 0 565
2009 0 77 109 87 34 101 4 0 0 49 0 0 461
2010 0 61 51 75 74 42 44 10 2 54 4 1 418
Total 14 392 604 425 316 488 97 29 10 109 11 9 2,504
4 Empirical Analysis: Term Structure in the Land Lease Market in 
Saxony-Anhalt 
4.1 Econometric Model Specification 
To measure whether a term structure exists in the price formation of land rentals, and how it 
may affect prices, we refer to a hedonic price regression model. The price is modelled as a 
function of land- and plot-specific characteristics such as soil quality, share of arable land and 
plot size. Since we consider a rather long time period (2002–2010), we further account for a 
time trend.  
No plot-specific coordinates are available and the lowest given regional level is the county 
level, NUTS 3.8 Thus, we consider county (“Landkreise”) dummy variables to capture 
regional unobservable effects such as local infrastructure. Spatial correlation, however, very 
likely remains in the error terms since it will not be fully captured by the plot-specific and 
regional (and time) dummy variables. Since the lack of information does not allow us to 
control for this correlation using spatial econometric techniques, we consider the regional 
average of the rental price from the previous year, in addition to the county dummies (cf. Pace 
et al. 1998 for more details about modelling spatio-temporal effects).9 
                                                          
8  According to the Nomenclature of territorial units for statistics (NUTS), the classification used by Eurostat, 
Federal States (”Laender”), correspond to NUTS 1, and counties (“Landkreise”) correspond to NUTS 3 
(NUTS 2 does not exist in Saxony-Anhalt). 
9  To calculate the average county prices for 2001, the observations from the original data set for 2001 were 
used. No average price was available for Stendal and Wittenberg for 2001, or Salzlandkreis for 2002. These 
values were replaced by the average prices reported by the Statistical Office Saxony-Anhalt for these 
counties and years (valid for 17 observations).  
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Moreover, we consider the term as another price determinant modelled in linear as well as 
quadratic form, and in interaction with year dummy variables. Through this specification, we 
allow for different shapes of the term structure: linear increasing or decreasing and single-
humped depending on the sign and significance levels of the respective coefficients. 
Furthermore, interacting the linear and quadratic term with year dummies allows us to 
estimate time-varying term structures. 
Since we focus on quantifying the term-effects, it is important to consider all relevant price-
determining variables to avoid an omitted variables bias (OVB). The functional form of the 
hedonic price regression is of further importance since a misspecification may also lead to 
biased estimates similar to the OVB. Thus, we apply the Box-Cox testing procedure. This test 
is based on transformation parameters—one for each equation side—ranging from one (no 
transformation) to zero (logarithmic transformation). Essentially, a linear price model is tested 
against a logarithmic–linear or logarithmic–logarithmic model specification. According to 
Osborne (2010), the estimated parameter should be used pragmatically, that is, the exact 
estimates should not be used. Rather, one should decide whether the parameter is close to 
1 (no transformation), to 0.5 (square root transformation) or to 0 (logarithmic transformation). 
Further, it is possible to exclude variables from the transformation testing, that is, not all 
variables need to be transformed. The idea is to keep the transformations as simple as 
possible, also because the Box-Cox testing procedure involves some disadvantages, such as 
impreciseness under a possible spatial correlation (Baltagi and Li, 2004).  
The estimated model is thus given by:  
(8) 
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where ie  denotes the error term, 
arable
iR  is the rent paid per ha of arable land in Euros, 
arable
iA  is 
the lot size in ha, and  arable
sca
2
ledi
A  area is the squared lot size in ha. The latter variable is 
scaled by the county average for normalisation and convergence reasons. Further, arableiQ  
denotes the soil quality points for arable land (soil quality index, see footnote 7) and arableiS  is 
the share of arable land on total land of the lot [0,1]. We also include a yearly time trend 
variable ( )itrend  starting with 0 in 2002, 1 6a a  denote the corresponding coefficients to be 
estimated, and cb indicates the respective coefficient for each county dummy variable 
ciCounty , where c indexes the counties.  
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Overall, we account for 11 counties since no observations exist for the cities of Halle (Saale), 
Magdeburg or Dessau. The county “Altmarkkreis Salzwedel” is chosen as a reference. 
Moreover,  ,lagged county
i
R  denotes the respective regional average price from the previous year 
in the respective region the tendered lot belongs to. 
The length of contract i (in years), denoted by Termi , enters the model in linear as well as in 
quadratic form, both in interaction with year dummies. If only the coefficient of the linear 
form, tc , is significant and positive (negative), the estimated term structure is upward- 
(downward-) sloping. This reflects increasing or decreasing rental prices that increase 
(decrease) with the length of the contract. In this case, the prices are expected to increase 
(decrease) in future so that the buyer pays more (less) for a long-term contract compared to 
several short-term contracts. If the coefficient of the quadratic form, td , is also significant and 
negative, the term structure is single-humped, that is, it portrays increasing influence of the 
term but at a decreasing rate.10  
4.2 Results 
The estimates of the empirical model as portrayed in (8) are shown in Table 3. We find that 
plot characteristics such as size, share and quality of arable land have a significant impact on 
the price per hectare of arable land. Soil quality has a positive impact on the rental price, that 
is, an increase of 1 per cent in soil quality points raises the land rental price by 0.91 per cent. 
The linear term of the plot size has a positive sign, whereas the squared plot size scaled by the 
county average shows a negative sign, that is, the size has a diminishing marginal influence 
on the price. Also the plot size of the arable land positively influences the price: if the share of 
arable land increases by 1 per cent, so does the price by 0.05 per cent. These findings are in 
line with results found in the literature, for example, Breustedt and Habermann (2011). 
The lagged regional rental price has a positive coefficient, meaning that a rise of the regional 
price in the previous year also increases the price in the current year. This shows that 
information in the local market is relevant. Likewise, Maddison (2009) has shown that the 
land price is influenced by observed prices of adjacent plots serving as references. The county 
dummies are significant in 6 out of 10 cases and capture the effects of unobserved information 
such as local infrastructure or neighbourhood relationships. For instance, the prices are found 
to be significantly higher in Jerichower Land County compared to Salzwedel County, which 
cannot be explained by soil quality and regional price levels.  
                                                          
10  A significant positive coefficient of the quadratic form would be possible, in principle, but it has no 
straightforward economic meaning and is not supported by theoretical term structure models. 
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Table 3.  Results  
Land lease rate determinant  Estimated Coefficient P-value 
Land characteristics   
Arable land (absolute, ha) 0.002 0.000*** 
Arable land squared (scaled by county) -0.011 0.001*** 
Share of arable land (per cent, logarithmised) 0.050 0.000*** 
Soil quality (logarithmised) 0.908 0.000*** 
Regional variable   
Lagged regional rental price, by county (logarithmised) 0.056 0.047** 
Time trend 0.085 0.000*** 
Location dummies   
Altmarkkreis Salzwedel (reference location) - - 
Anhalt-Bitterfeld -0.007 0.822 
Burgenlandkreis -0.007 0.857 
Börde 0.033 0.272 
Harz 0.039 0.183 
Jerichower Land 0.076 0.009*** 
Mansfeld-Südharz -0.134 0.000*** 
Saalekreis -0.156 0.000*** 
Salzlandkreis -0.135 0.000*** 
Stendal 0.050 0.046** 
Wittenberg -0.098 0.002*** 
Term Structure   
D2002 Term 0.062 0.009*** 
D2003 Term 0.067 0.005*** 
D2004 Term 0.016 0.497 
D2005 Term 0.025 0.319 
D2006 Term -0.029 0.134 
D2007 Term 0.071 0.000*** 
D2008 Term 0.148 0.000*** 
D2009 Term 0.117 0.000*** 
D2010 Term 0.083 0.000*** 
   
D2002 Term² -0.002 0.164 
D2003 Term² -0.003 0.156 
D2004 Term² -0.001 0.814 
D2005 Term² -0.001 0.785 
D2006 Term² 0.004 0.175 
D2007 Term² -0.003 0.481 
D2008 Term² -0.012 0.000*** 
D2009 Term² -0.011 0.000*** 
D2010 Term² -0.008 0.000*** 
Constant 1.017 0.000*** 
Note: Asterisks *** and ** denote significance at the 1 and 5 per cent levels, respectively. 
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The variables related to time and contract term are the most relevant to our research question. 
The time trend is significantly positive, confirming the price increase that we found by visual 
inspection of Figure 1. Regarding the term structure, we find the following results (lower part 
of Table 3): The coefficients for the linear term variables are significantly positive for the 
years 2002, 2003 and from 2007–2010. Additionally, we have significantly negative 
coefficients for the quadratic term variable from 2008–2010. This means that we detect a 
positive linear, that is, upward-sloping term structure for 2002, 2003 and 2007, and a negative 
quadratic, that is, single-humped term structure from 2008–2010. In all other years, no term 
structure could be discovered. Even though the linear and the quadratic part are insignificant 
for a specific year, they might still have a joint effect (cf. Gunnelin and Söderberg 2003). 
Hence, we perform Wald tests for each year to test whether the respective coefficients tc  and 
td  are both significantly different from zero. The results displayed in Table 4 support 
significant term structures in six out of nine years. 
Table 4.  Term Structure of Land Rental Prices 
Year p-values Wald test ( 0t tc d  ) Term Structure 
2002 0.005*** upward-sloping 
2003 0.001*** upward-sloping 
2004 0.410 n.s. 
2005 0.328 n.s. 
2006 0.325 n.s. 
2007 0.000*** upward-sloping 
2008 0.000*** single-humped 
2009 0.000*** single-humped 
2010 0.000*** single-humped 
 
These different shapes of the term structure, which are portrayed in Figure 3 for an average 
lease, can be interpreted as follows: In the first years of the observation period, lessees 
expected future rental price growth, and hence they accepted higher rents for longer 
maturities. This expectation can be rationalised by the fact that at the beginning of the last 
decade, land rental prices in East Germany were still considerably lower compared to West 
Germany. At that time it was rather likely that land rental prices in East Germany would rise 
to West German levels. In fact, this price gap became smaller over time so that the upward-
sloping term structure should fade out unless further reasons come into play. This was 
actually the case in 2007, when agricultural commodity prices began to soar. This price boom 
increased the attractiveness of investing in agribusiness in general, and also created new 
demand for land in Saxony-Anhalt by local farmers and non-residential investors (cf. Forstner 
et al. 2011). This optimistic view of returns from agriculture is reflected by the upward-
sloping term structure in 2007.  
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5 Conclusions 
This paper adapts the concept of a term structure to agricultural land rental prices. So far, this 
notion has only been applied to agricultural commodity prices. Though conceptually similar 
to other assets, the term structure of land rental prices captures expectations about the 
profitability of farmland use that go beyond the time horizon of other traded financial 
instruments in agriculture, for example futures contracts. Thus, it is tempting to utilise the 
term structure of land rental prices for an assessment of farming’s long-term economic 
prospects. We develop a hedonic pricing model that allows for different, possibly time-
varying shapes of the term structure curve while controlling for other price-relevant 
characteristics of leased land. We apply this model to land lease contracts that have been 
concluded by the major supplier of agricultural land in Saxony-Anhalt, the BVVG, between 
2002 and 2010. We find an upward-sloping term structure in 2002, 2003, and 2007, that is, 
market participants expected growing rental prices and hence agreed on higher rents for 
longer maturities. In the subsequent years of our sample, however, we detect a single-humped 
term structure. This finding indicates that the optimistic view on returns from farming has 
been tempered. 
Apart from the novelty of this type of empirical analysis on land rental prices, our results have 
some implications for agricultural policy and structural change in agriculture. An increasing 
share of agricultural land is leased by farmers in Germany as well as in other countries. The 
expenses for this production factor constitute the most important cost driver in farming. Thus, 
any change in the land rental price will have consequences for farms’ competitiveness and the 
income distribution between land owners and tenants. Increasing land prices particularly 
endangers less efficient farms and may force them to quit agriculture. Moreover, higher land 
rental prices capitalise into higher sale prices, making it more difficult for farmers to buy the 
land they operate. Thus, it is not surprising that the increase of land prices that farmers 
experienced in East Germany over the last decade has triggered a debate on the necessity of 
regulating land markets. Measures that have been proposed to dampen a further price surge 
include, for instance, price boundaries or restricted access to land for non-local farmers, as 
well as investors not being related to the farming business (cf. Siegmund et al. 2012). Against 
this background, it is very desirable to know about the future development of land prices. 
Based on our results, we argue that extrapolating land rental price changes without accounting 
for their term structure may lead to biased predictions. In fact, a naïve price index that simply 
averages lease rates and ignores the time of the contract formation and/or the contract length 
will overestimate the increase in land rental prices at the end of the last decade, where a 
significant hump of the term structure has been found. 
However, a word of caution is necessary when interpreting the term structure curves for land 
lease rates. As mentioned before, it is not certain that the lease rate of a long-term contract is 
an unbiased forecast of the rental prices that will prevail at maturity because the price of the 
long-term contract may include a risk premium. Moreover, generalising empirical results is 
much more difficult compared to other financial assets since land markets are less liquid and 
price formation may be influenced by local peculiarities, for example the market power of 
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regional buyers or suppliers. Thus, a next step should be to conduct similar analyses for land 
markets in other regions and countries. Finally, an empirical validation of the forecasting 
capability of term structure models in the context of land markets is suggested as an area for 
further research. 
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